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George Soros' New Paradigm for Financial Markets
ILMR Editors'
I. INTRODUCTION

The tlnancial crisis of the last year has provoked debate, aroused
speculation, and renewed interest in the viability of our tlnancial
system. One of the most successful hedge fund managers of the last
few decades, George Soros, has rarely shied away from criticizing
what he perceives to be the shortcomings of free-market economics,
and his latest book is no exception. In The New Paradigm for
Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What it Means, I
Soros provokes thought about the global credit crisis, but falls short
of providing a workable new paradigm for global tlnancial markets.
This book review explores Soros' latest work in the context of the
current market and explains why the new paradigm fails to meet
expectations. Part II provides background information about Soros
and draws connections between his experiences and his work. Part
III then summarizes the book itself, with emphasis on Soros' theory
of reflexivity. Finally, Part IV explores both positive and negative
critical analyses of Soros' work-most notably, his theory of
reflexivity.
II. GEORGE SOROS: THE FAILED PHILOSOPHER, SUCCESSFUL
SPECULATOR, AND LEFT-WING POLITICAL ACTIVIST

George Soros is a self-described "failed philosopher"2 and
"successful speculator"" whose past has influenced the progressive
political ideology represented by his economic ideas as revealed in
New Paradigm. Born in Budapest in 1930, George Soros is one of
the most controversial living tlnanciers. Hailed by some as a visionary

* The ILMR editors responsible t()r writing and editing this book review include David
Fazzolare and Natalia Martins Merino, J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
Cniversity (2009), and Erin Bradley, Tyler Hawkes and Valerie Paul, J.D. candidates, J.
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University (2010).
I. GEOR(;E SOROS, THE NEW PARA.])!GM f'OR FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE CREDIT
CRISIS Of' 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS (2008). The book contains 162 pages (along with a
lengthy introductory section), and the ISBN is 1-58648-683-9.
2. [d. at 12 (referring to the lack of success of his economic and philosophical theories,
including reflexivity).
3. Id. at 106.
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and scorned by others as a "bleeding heart liberal,"4 he has headed
multiple societies, donated billions to charity, and is currently
number twenty-nine on the list of the world's billionaires. s In
addition, he has impacted the world of finance with his theories and
investment strategies. While this review mainly focuses on his latest
book, a basic familiarity with his biographical and philosophical
background is helpful to understanding the forces and ideas shaping
his writing. His experiences have clearly shaped his economic beliefs,
as evidenced by the lengthy autobiographical sections of his book. 6
His biography is full of interesting events, which helped
influence and frame his outlook on life, including growing up as a
Jew in Hungary during the Second World War and observing his
father's attitude towards money. He declined to follow his father's
philosophy to make only as much money as "was necessary to make
ends meet,,7 and chose instead to study Economics in London.
There he was introduced to the ideas of Karl Popper, which would
impact his own theory of reflexivity, and in some ways, fueled him to
begin working in earnest in the financial sector to demonstrate the
validity of his theories. 8
Soros learned arbitrage trading in the 1950s and moved to the
United States where he started working diligently as a trader until
the early 1960s. Eventually he became one of the flrst hedge fund
managers and went on to achieve his current level of wealth through
a series of incredible speculative successes. Despite the "failure" ofor, perhaps more aptly, lack of public receptivity to-his theory of
reflexivity, George Soros distinguished himself through several
audacious styles of investing". He is famous for "breaking the
[English] pound,"iO where he reportedly gained one billion dollars
on a single day through short selling the pound, II as well as for

4. Stan Tyminski, Soros - Real Father of RejiJrms in Poland, Sep. IS, 2002, at 4,
http://ww\\..transducti(>I1.com/stdnpdfjs()ros. pdf
5. The World's Billionaires, http://www.t()rbes.com/2009/03/11/\\.orlds·richest·
people-billionaires-2009-billionaires_land.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2009).
6. SOROS, supra note I, at 12-2S, 106-22.
7. [d. at 13.
8. See id. at 13-17.
9. See Matthew Vadum and James Dellingn, Billionaires fiJr BzjJ GIlJ'ernment: Wbat's
Next jiJr Geor;w Soros's Democracy Alliance', fOUNDATION WATCH, Dec. 2008, al'ailable at
http://www.freerepublic.com/t()(us/fnews/1947269 /posts (last visited Aug. 21, 2009).
10. Oliver August & Alasdair Murray, Soros Loses $2bn as Market Rout Takes Toll, THE
TIMES, Oct. 31,1997, Stock Market, at 28.
II. See id.
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triggering the crash of some Asian currencies several years later
through similar practices. 12 French courts have even convicted him of
insider trading for investments made in a French bank. 13 In addition,
his Quantum Fund, one of the first private hedge funds, increased
from $1,000 in 1969 14 to $5.5 billion in just thirty years. IS
Although he self-professedly has not yet made "enough"
moneyl6 through his controversial investments, he has founded
several philanthropic organizations and has donated billions of
dollars to charities and causes l7 focusing primarily on "foster[ingJ the
development of open societies. "IH His quest for open societies has
included support for the democratization of Eastern European
countries and donations of substantial amounts to African projects. 19
Of more particular interest are his donations to political
organizations. As expressed throughout Nell? Paradigm) Soros
appears to have a marked antipathy for George W. Bush and his
administration/a having accused the now former U.S. President of
sullying the principles of democracy21 and, more recently, creating
the perfect regulatory environment for the current economic crisis. 22
12. Steven Erlanger, Malaysia's Conspiracy Theory Draws Criticism from Albri.-qht, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 1997, at A8.
13. Floyd Norris, Insider- Tradin<q Conviction of Soros Is Upheld in France, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar.
25,
2005,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.htmI1res~9E05 E5D8I73FF936A15750COA9639C8B63.
14. Bruce fenton, Who is Gcor.He Soros', FENTONREPORT, Mar. 19, 2007,
http://in\'esting.fentonreport.com/2007 /03/who-is-george-soros.html (last visited Aug. 21,
2009).
15. Id.
16. Deborah Solomon, Question fJr Geor,..qe Soros: Indebted to Liberal Causes, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11,2006, Magazine, at 18.
17. Executive Bios: George Soros, http://www.soros.org/about/bios/a_soros (last
visited Aug. 21, 2009).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See, e,H., SOROS, supra note I, at 41-44 (asserting that an aide in the Bush
administration, "presumably Karl Rove," was actively "promot[ing] the manipulation of truth
as a superior approach [to understanding reality]" and concluding that the administration's
manipulative approach to reality posed a serious danger to the concept of open society); id. at
124 ("The United States during the Bush cu.iministration tailed to exercise proper political
leadership. As a result, the United States has sufiered a precipitous decline in its power and
influence in the world."); id. at 158 ("Unti)rtunately this [Bush] administration shows no
understanding ofthe predicament in which it finds itself").
21. See Sololl1on, Jupra note 16; Jee also George Soros, Speech to the National Press
Club: Why We Must Not Re-elect President Bush (Sep. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.co!1l!1londreams.org/views04/0928-16.htm (explaining Sows' opinion on
President Bush's fi)reign policy and other issues).
22. See .qcnerallv SOROS, Jupra note I.
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Since 2003, Soros has spent millions of dollars to either remove
President Bush from oHice or defeat his initiatives. 23
As a result, conservative commentators often characterize Soros
as an "ultra left-wing,,24 philanthropist and investor. It is at times
difficult to ignore the conclusion that his liberal political disposition
echoes or informs his approach to economic principles. Indeed, in
New Paradigm he clearly announces his bias against many traditional
economic models and theories, especially those on the conservative
end of the spectrum. This perspective is underscored through
frequent and recurring references to the failure of the Bush
administration and the need for a different type of investment
strategy-that is, as Soros specifically states, one initiated and
supported by those on the other side of the political aisle. 25
However, the reality of his liberal political viewpoint should be
considered only as one factor in evaluating his work, not as the
determinative element. And it would be extremely unwise for those
who may disagree with Soros on politics to dismiss his book without
seriously analyzing and evaluating his theories-especially given his
extensive knowledge of, and success in, the financial markets. The
rest of this review examines the theories presented by this
controversial financial figure to determine their utility and
practicability .

III. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF SOROS' NEW PARADIGM
New Paradigm attempts to convince the reader that there is a
need for a new paradigm for financial markets because the prevailing
paradigm does not accurately explain market behavior. In New
Paradigm, Soros introduces his theory of economics, called
reflexivity, which he posits as the basis for this new paradigm.

23. See Solomon, supra note 16 (explaining that George Soros spent approximately
$27.5 million on anti-Bush groups).
24. See,
ceq.,
American
Flag Blog-The Vast
Left Wing Conspiracy,
http://www.tbgstu/fwm/blog/2006/1 0/06/the-v3st-left-wing-conspiracy/ (last visited
Aug. 21,2009).
25. SOROS, supra note 1, at 142 ("Major new initiatives will have to await the new
president, and only a Democratic president can be expected to turn things around and lead the
nation in a new direction.").
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A. A New Paradigm Must Replace Equilibrium Theory Because the

Latter Fails to Accurately Explain Market Behavior

Soros calls for a new paradigm by taking issue with the existing
paradigm based on the classical economic theory "that tlnancial
markets tend towards equilibrium.,,26 Although Soros concedes that
equilibrium theory has its merits,27 he blames it for the development
of regulatory policies that allow financial markets to function with
little oversight. 2x Soros refers to policies that give deference to free
markets as "market fundamentalism" and claims that "market
fundamentalism is no better than Marxist dogma. ,,29
Soros states that market fundamentalism is based on the theory
of perfect competition introduced by Adam Smith and refined by
classical economists. 30 But he fails to specifically address how perfect
competition gives rise to market fundamentalism other than to imply
that because government intervention in free markets has always
been flawed, some have inferred that free markets are always
perfect. 31 He does not explicitly state, but appears to imply, that
market fundamentalism is based on the flawed premise that
equilibrium theory is correct and market prices will correct
themselves as markets move towards equilibrium. 32
Soros contends that this prevailing paradigm cannot explain how
the current credit crisis is unfolding. 33 More importantly, he blames
the prevailing paradigm that markets move towards equilibrium as
the primary reason for the credit crisis in the first place. 34 In
particular, Soros believes that equilibrium theory and market
fundamentalism led regulators to shirk their responsibility by relying
on the free market to "correct its own excesses. ,,35
Contrary to market fundamentalism, which assumes that the

26. [d. at 73. Soros boldly asserts that the "prevailing paradigm is false and urgently
needs to be replaced." Id. at 6.
27. Id. at 72.
28. Id. at 74.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 92.
31. Id.
32. Sows does state that "markets do not necessarily tend toward equilibrium" and that
Ieli: alone, markets are given to extremes characterized by excessive advances and excessive
declines. [d.
33. Id. at 102.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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market is always right, Soros bases his new paradigm on the opposite
assertion that "financial markets are always wrong. ,,36 Although he
describes the new paradigm's premise, it is difficult to explain exactly
what the new paradigm entails because Soros only discusses it in
terms of what it does, rather than what it is.37 Soros essentially
reiterates that the new paradigm represents a rejection of market
fundamentalism, without offering any positive alternative paradigm.

B. The Theory ofReflexivity: A Basisfor the New Paradigm?
Soros' theory of reflexivity is better stated and understood as the
theory that it is impossible to predict the outcome of future events
involving human intervention. Soros bases his theory of reflexivity on
the premise that humans cannot have perfect knowledge of the
world because they are a part of it. 3N From this premise Soros
concludes that people with imperfect knowledge function in two
ways.39 The first, "cognitive function," is where people seek to
perfect their imperfect knowledge by trying to gain a better
understanding of their situation in the world. 40 The second,
"manipulative function," is where people with imperfect knowledge
seek to improve their status by manipulating situations
advan tageously. 41
Dismissing the notion that these two functions operate in
isolation,42 Soros concludes that when these two functions operate
together, individuals cannot make decisions based on knowledge. 43
Soros asserts that when the cognitive and the manipulative functions
operate together, peoples' intentions and expectations affect the
premises on which they base their knowledge. 44 But because
intentions and expectations involve future uncertainties, an
individual's perception of the world as she understands it cannot be

36. Soros views financial markets
root cause of them. Id. at 76.
37. For example, Soros asserts
cautiously than the old paradigm. Id. at
financial markets as a historical account.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id.
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78. Elsewhere he says that the new paradigm interprets
Id. at 104.
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considered knowledge. 45 In other words, as people try to understand
a world int1uenced by other people, there is a "two-way connection"
between one person's understanding of the world and the world as it
is really is. As such, a person's expectations are often unmet because
others' actions change circumstances in a way that the person did not
expect. This "two-way connection" is called reflexivity,46 and it
further states that the natural result of reflexive situations is that
outcomes may differ from expectations. 47
Applying this reasoning to the financial world, he describes the
boom-bust model for the world of finance and contends that the
"boom-bust pattern is ... a convincing example of reflexivity. ,,4X
Soros' boom-bust model has eight stages and begins "with a
prevailing bias and a prevailing trend.,,4<i In the first stage, no one
recognizes that a trend exists. In the second stage, the "trend is
reinforced by the prevailing bias." Soros argues that during this
stage, "the process approaches far-from-equilibrium territory." 50
The second stage may be followed by a testing period in stage three
where prices may decline from the prevailing trend temporarily.5l
Assuming that the prevailing bias and prevailing trend "survive the
testing," the normal rules become inapplicable and "far-fromequilibrium conditions" are reached in stage four. 52 Stage five
presents a "moment of truth" when prices cannot be sustained based
on "exaggerated expectations," followed by a "twilight period" in
stage six "when people continue to play the game although they no
longer believe in it. ,,53 Stage seven occurs when "a crossover point is
reached," characterized by downward trending prices and a reversed
bias, all of which leads to stage eight, an accelerated downward price
movement commonly called a crash. 54

45. Id.
46. Id. at 5. Soros explains that "[r ]etlexive situations are characterized by a lack of
correspondence between the participants' views and the actual state of affairs." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 102.
49. Soros points to the conglomerate boom as an example of a prevailing bias and a
prevailing trcnd-"a preference t()r rapid earnings growth per share" and "the ability of
companies to generate high earnings growth per share by using their stock to acquire other
companies selling at a lower multiple of earnings," respectively. Id. at 65.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 66.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Other than stating that the boom-bust pattern describes market
behavior in a way that contradicts equilibrium theory, Soros does not
explain how the boom-bust model relates to reflexivity. 55 Instead, he
explains that there are forms of reflexivity other than boom-bust
patterns, and that "two-way, reflexive connections are much more
common in financial markets than boom-bust sequences.",6 If these
examples and explanations of reflexivity seem vague or confusing, it
is because they are. Soros' description of rct1exivity and rctlexive
situations in financial markets leave the reader wondering whether
reflexivity means anything other than difficulty in predicting the
future.
IV. ANALYSIS

With his book Soros succeeds at provoking debate on how to
deal with the financial crisis, but nothing more. He fails to convince
the careful reader that there is a need for a new financial paradigm,
he falls short of providing a workable new paradigm for financial
markets, and his lengthy autobiographical detours distract the reader
from the purported purpose of the book-to revolutionize economic
theory.
A. Soros Succeeds at Provoking Debate on How to Deal with the
Financial Crisis

Soros succeeds in provoking debate about how best to deal with
the current credit crisis by making the case that this crisis is "the
worst financial crisis since the I930s,,57 and calling for a new
paradigm to deal with it. Soros asserts that the current crisis is global
and "marks the end of an era of credit expansion based on the dollar
as the international reserve currency. ,,5X For example, after the
Internet bubble burst in late 2000, interest rates fell and continued
to decrease after the terrorist attacks on September II'h.,<) Routinely
funded subprime mortgage loans resulted in a bust in the housing
market as wel1. 60 Because bankers repackaged and sold mortgages as
55. Id. at 102.
56. Id. at 70. Because people investing in the stock market always make decisions based
OIl imperfect kno",ledge, Soros asserts that market prices reflect the prevailing bias resulting
from these misconceptions rather than "correct valuations." Id.
57. Id. at vii.
58. Id.
59. Id. at xiv-xv.
60. Id. at xvi.
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investments, the housing bust caused a panic with global
ramitlcations. 61 The breakdown of the mortgage system put pressure
on the banking system, which in turn faltered. 62
Exacerbating these problems, the crisis "has spread from one
segment of the market to others .... and the uncertainties are likely
to remain unresolved for an extended period of time. This is
impeding the normal functioning of the t1nancial system and is liable
to have far-reaching consequences for the real economy.,,63 Soros
contends the bigger problem is that t1nancial markets and t1nancial
authorities have not recognized the problem, leading him to "the
conclusion that both the t1nancial authorities and market participants
harbor fundamental misconceptions about the way t1nancial markets
function.,,64 Thus, Soros calls for a new paradigm to better
understand how t1nancial markets function.
B. Soros Fails to Convince the Careful Reader There is a Need for a
New Financial Paradigm

I

Soros' remarkable success as an investor gives him a voice few
investors have attained. His standing gives his ideas a platform to
encourage discussion of the issues he raises. The passion he brings to
his books demonstrates the reality of the current crisis, and the
potential foresight of a man some have called "a successful prophet
of the markets."65 However, when analyzing his book, his high
protlle and success as an investor must be divorced from the merits
of the ideas he presents.
These ideas center on the "theory of reflexivity." Classical
economists likely view Soros' explanation of reflexivity as an
elaborate reinvention of the wheel. Economic theory holds that
boom-bust cycles result as markets strive to t1nd equilibrium, that is,
appropriate prices for assets. Economists, psychologists, and
historians study economic bubbles ad nauseam trying to understand
what causes this phenomenon.
Soros' theory of reflexivity adds very little to the current
understanding of economic bubbles. The equilibrium theory explains
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
apailable

Id. at X\'ii.
Id.
Id.
Id.

John Authors, A Successful Prophet of the Markets, FIN. TIMES, May 19, 2008,
at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/304t1e6e-253b-11dd-a14a000077b07658.htllll?nclick_check~ 1.
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that bubbles emerge as temporary market imbalances that will be
smoothed out over time; the bubbles "pop" and smooth out the
imbalances. The equilibrium theory assumes that the markets are
right at least some of the time, but not always.66 In fact, showing
when bubbles exist before the collapse has proven nearly impossible,
with one economist comparing it to "trying to predict a first-pitch
curve-ball. ,,67 Thus, while imperfect, the equilibrium theory allows
investors to view the cycles in the market as attempts to find an
appropriate price for the assets involved. Economics provides a
framework to view these bubbles as temporary disturbances that the
"invisible hand" will remedy over time. Ref1exivity really asserts little
more than that the markets behave irrationally at times. Classical
economics never asserts that markets always behave rationally, and
reflexivity adds nothing to the explanation.
Soros' explanation of the boom-bust cycle also offers nothing
not already explained by economists. 6s For example, he states that
"far-from-equilibrium conditions" cannot be explained adequately
using the equilibrium theory, but then fails to address how reflexivity
explains the corrections more clearly.6\1 Classical economics simply
holds that bigger deviations lead to bigger corrections. If the market
is really "far-from-equilibrium," the pull back to equilibrium will be
a certainty. Soros adds no real enlightenment to the situation in New
Paradigm. Merely stating that markets sometimes reach prices far
from where they should be does not result in a new paradigm; after
all, economists have recognized bubbles for hundreds of years. Thus,
Soros' theory of reflexivity fails to add any real understanding to
economic theory.
C. Reflexifity Falls Short of Providing a Workable New Paradigm for
Financial Markets
Reflexivity also fails to provide a practical solution to the
shortcomings of the free market-or, at the least, Soros' explanation
of it fails. He bemoans the fact that "market fundamentalism" was
unable to "correct its own excesses." But a common name for a large
66. Marc Goedhart, Do Fundamentals or Emotions Dripe the Stock Market?, TilE
MCKINSEY Q., Apr. 13,2005, a)'ailable at http://www.chcom/article.din/3839631.
67. Earl A. Thompson and Charles R. Hickson, Prcdictinll Rubblcs, 8 GLOBAL nllS. &
ECON. REV. 217, 224 (2006), available at http://www.econ.ucla.edu/thompson/
Predicting%20bubbles.pdf
68. See SOROS, supra note I, at 65-69.
69. Id. at 72.
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drop in the market is a "correction.,,70 In the market, the fall of the
market price of goods brings investors who took poor risks back to
reality. Soros fails to explain how someone wielding "reflexivity"
could correct the market more efficiently. This begs the question at
the root of "the new paradigm": What assurance would the market
have that a "market czar" would be more effIcient at setting realistic
prices than a free market?
But perhaps the best example of the practical limits of reflexivity
can be found in Soros' own investment strategy. A famous and
colorful quote by Soros' own son, Robert, shows the very limited
role reflexivity has played in his father's investment decisions: "the
[real] reason he changes his position on the market or whatever is
because his back starts killing him. It has nothing to do with reason.
He literally goes into a spasm, and it's this early warning sign. ,,71
Surely Robert has employed a healthy dose of hyperbole and
sarcasm, but the quote does suggest that Soros' real genius may be as
much intuition as reason.72 This may also help elucidate how
applying the theory of reflexivity to Soros' own investment strategies
leaves serious, unexplainable gaps in the record.
D. Soros) Autobiographical Detours Distract the Reader from the
Purported Purpose of his Book

The purpose of Soros' work is to explain his theory of reflexivity
and how it should form the basis of a new paradigm for financial
markets. But Soros spends much of his time on autobiographical
detours and asides that distract the reader from that purpose. In the
introduction, Soros gives a roadmap that states he will devote the
first part of his book to the theory of reflexivity.73 He then qualifies
this statement by saying that this theory "goes well beyond the
financial markets. ,,74 By so doing, Soros allows himself the flexibility
to spend forty-seven pages (of the I62-page book) discussing his
past career failures and successes. The lengthy autobiographical
sketches and real-time market experimentation in the book suggest
to the reader that either Soros was trying too hard to make the book
long enough to be publishable length, or that he simply enjoys

70. Id. at 102.
71. Id. at 20-21.
72. See RICHARD L. PETERSON, INSIDE THE INVESTOR'S BRAIN 70-71 (2007).
73. Set' SOROS, JUpra note 1, at x.
74. [d.
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writing about himself and took advantage of another outlet for his
vanity. (Perhaps this latter theory explains why his name is several
times larger on all sides of the cover than the title of the book itself
Soros takes an entire chapter to discuss his failure as both a
philosopher and a mathematician. 75 Later in the book, he uses
another chapter to discuss his success as a financial speculator. 76 In
the subsequent chapter, Soros describes a real-time market
experiment to showcase his abilities as a financial speculator. He
documents his thoughts and decisions beginning with January 1,
2008 and continuing through March 23, 2008. This short exercise
gives the reader a small glimpse into Soros' psyche, but does little to
show his theory of ref1exivity at work. Perhaps if he had spent an
entire year documenting his work before publishing the book, the
experiment might have resonated better with readers and provided
more insight into his new paradigm. Although they articulate Soros'
reasons for his career choice, these chapters do little to actually
advance his theory of reflexivity or explain the new paradigm.
Much of Soros' book is devoted to explaining his philosophies,
but he never clearly demonstrates their applicability to the current
crisis. Soros continually tries to convince readers that the theory of
ref1exivity is an economic theory. He follows his boom-bust
explanation with an example of a company that "is a little too
asymmetrical to serve as a good illustration. ,m Readers will find it
hard to believe that Soros' theories work when the example he gives
does not clearly support his theory at work. However lengthy his
explanations may be, they do little to prove the economics behind
his theory of reflexivity. All the explanations of his philosophy leave
readers thinking that his theory of ref1exivity is merely based on
social science.
V. CONCLUSION

Ultimately, New Paradigm proves to be little more than a short
autobiography, a partial treatise on "ref1exivity," and a platform for
Soros to criticize the policies of the free-market system. However, as
with many critics, he fails to offer any new insights into the current
financial crisis, and especially fails in accomplishing his stated goal: to
unleash a new paradigm for global financial markets that discredits
75. See id. at 12-24.
76. See id. at 106-21.
77. Id.at67.
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and replaces classical economists' equilibrium theol)'. Perhaps a more
appropriate title would be: "Reflexivity: Markets Are Not Always
Right." But, after all, who would be interested in that?
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